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**DRAWING CONCLUSIONS: LESSONS AND EFFECTS
OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE**

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The centenary commemoration of the Armenian genocide demands a critical analysis as well as a summarizing reflection about achievements, recoils and stagnation in the various fields of action: ethics, politics, law and legislation, science, academia and education. Those of us, who for decades have accompanied developments in these various fields of action, may have experienced resignation or frustration with regard to ethics and politics, whereas remarkable progress has been achieved in science, academia and also education.

My contribution tries in its first part to explore the current state of art in genocide studies, related to the Armenian genocide, analyzing as well some of the still existing unsolved or neglected issues, while interpreting in the second part the flaws and failures of politics, law and legislation with reference to the German case.

A Crime of Silence

As a state crime that has been committed during the World War I – called by contemporaries the “Great” or “European War” – the murder of 1.5 million Ottoman Armenians fell remarkably soon into oblivion and remained nearly uninvestigated until the late 1970s. The reasons are complex. In the first place, after the World War II historians were rather preoccupied with research of this disastrous event than with the investigation of its bleak predecessor, including the ‘Holocaust before the Holocaust’, as Elie Wiesel has dubbed the genocide against the Ottoman Armenians. It took time until the coherency of both wars and the interrelationship of massive crimes against civilians that has been committed behind the smokescreens of the First and Second World War captured the interest of the academia. This is in particular true for scholars in Germany, who felt it their obligation to focus on the extermination of approximately six million European Jews in the course of World War II. The Germans’ attempt to ‘cope’ with their genocidal national past and to ‘repair’ unrepairable human and cultural losses politically and academically caused a doctrine of the Holocaust’s singu-

larity or incomparability¹. Even linguistically, the crime has been marked as outstanding, as expressed by the nouns ‘holocaust’², or ‘Shoah’. This practice of linguistically emphasizing the alleged uniqueness of a case has been repeated by the use of such nouns as ‘Armenocide’³, or ‘Seyfo’ (‘sword’)⁴. Although psychologically comprehensible, if used by survivors, the insistence on the uniqueness of a genocide case is juridically illogical and causes severe harm to co-victim groups, as experienced by the Sinti, Roma and various groups of travelling people, who were victimized by the same Nazi regime and simultaneously with the Jews, or the Aramaic and Greek-Orthodox co-victims of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. Yet the insistence on singular designations is indicative for a more general methodic problem that seems to be caused by a self-imposed compulsion of scholars of historiography to be original. In the case of the Holocaust and the Armenian genocide the designated singularity seems also be driven by the ‘possessiveness’ of the main victim group and its relegation of other simultaneously victimized groups as ‘secondary’, ‘inferior’ or ‘irrelevant’.

With a delay of at least 60 years, scholars of genocide have finally unearthed the Armenian genocide⁵. Book titles among first publication such as ‘Taboo Armenia’⁶ or ‘A Crime of Silence’⁷ alluded to the unfamiliarity and politically intended oblivion. The second title in particular indicates that science at this stage was driven by human rights and ethical concerns. The debate on the Armenian genocide in international bodies that has started in the early 1970s constituted the larger frame. The *Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities of the UN*

¹ **Scherzberg L.** (Hg.), “Doppelte Vergangenheitsbewältigung” und Singularität des Holocaust. Saarbrücken 2012 (Theologie. Geschichte. Beiheft 5). - http://universaar.uni-saarland.de/journals/public/journals/3/Komplettausgabe_tgBeiheft5.pdf

² Historically, “holocaust” has been used as a synonym “to describe a human rights disaster” since the late XIX century and in the context of the destruction of Ottoman Christians, in particular Armenians. Cf. **Hamburg D. A.**, Preventing Genocide: Practical Steps toward Early Detection and Effective Action, Boulder, London, 2008, p. 38; the first mention in this context being the front-page headline of the “New York Times” on September 10, 1895. Cf. **Balakian P.**, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response, New York, 2004, p. 11. Winston Churchill called the First Second World War annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians an “administrative holocaust”. – **Churchill W.**, The World Crisis, 1911-1918, Vol. 5 (Aftermath), New York, 1927, p. 157. After Second World War, Jewish authors such as Nobel Prize winner Elie Wiesel (1958) and media (“Yad Vashem Bulletin”, April 1957) began to use “holocaust” as a synonym for the genocide against the European Jewry. “Since 1972 the term was gradually accepted in the English usage as a synonym for the murder of the European Jews”. Cf. **Heinsohn G.**, Lexikon der Völkermorde (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1998), pp. 174-175. In its early application, “holocaust” seemed to have been related to the frequent practice of Ottoman Muslim perpetrators to burn their Christian victims alive; the most known incident being the burning of about 3.000 Armenians in their cathedral at Urfa in the end of December 1895.

³ **Prince M.**, Un génocide impuni : L’arménocide. Paris, 1967; followed by Wolfgang Gust. Cf. www.armenocide.de

⁴ For the genocide against the Aramaic speaking Christians, or Syriacs, in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman occupied Iran 1914-1918.

⁵ Genocide studies is a relative young multi- and interdisciplinary science that includes not only historians, but also sociologists as well as jurists, philologists etc.

⁶ The title of the German edition of Yves Ternon’s first monograph on the Armenian genocide. Cf. **Ternon Y.**, Tabu Armenien: Geschichte eines Völkermords, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin, 1981. Interestingly, the French original edition of 1977 did not make such an allusion: Cf. Les Arméniens. Histoire d’un génocide, Paris, 1977.

⁷ A Crime of Silence: the Armenian Genocide; the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal, London, Cambridge (Mass.), 1985.

Commission on Human Rights had decided in 1971 to carry out a study on the prevention and the punishment of the crime of genocide, appointing for this task its member Nicodème Ruhashyankiko (Rwanda). In paragraph 30 of his interim report of 1973, Mr. Ruhashyankiko mentioned “the massacre of the Armenians” as the first case of genocide in the XX century¹. This mention in passing provoked Turkish interventions on many levels of the UN and led to the suppression of the reference in subsequent versions of the report². Against the background of ongoing debates about the restitution of the suppressed paragraph in the wording of the report the international human rights NGO *Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal* convened a session at the Sorbonne University (Paris) on 13-16 April 1984, where international experts in genocide studies and jurists were heard by a likewise international jury that ruled in its verdict that

- “(...) the extermination of the Armenian population groups through deportation and massacre constitute a crime of genocide not subject to statutory limitations within the definition of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948. With respect to the condemnation of this crime, the aforesaid Convention is declaratory of existing law in that it takes note of rules which were already in force at the time of the incriminated acts;
- The Young Turk government is guilty of this genocide, with regard to the acts perpetrated between 1915 and 1917;
- The Armenian genocide is also an “international crime” for which the Turkish state must assume responsibility, without using the pretext of a discontinuity in the existence of the state to elude that responsibility;
- The United Nations Organization and each of its members have the right to demand recognition and to assist the Armenian people to that end”³.

For the legal and political recognition of the Armenian genocide, this evidence-based verdict undoubtedly represented a milestone. The findings of the *Tribunal’s* session of 1984 were soon published in French, English and German, followed in 2011 by a Turkish edition⁴.

With their archival and historiographical studies, scholars provided the factual basis for human rights activists, jurists and politicians, who have engaged in recognition advocacy. However, with the increasing number of academic contributions to the study of the Armenian genocide this utilitarian interconnection between science, politics and human rights gradually ceased. At present, the genocide against the Armenians can no longer be paraphrased as a “crime of silence”. On the contrary and judging by the huge amount of scholarly contributions, this genocide is quantitatively

¹ Genocide scholarship of today does not agree with this assessment, since the near to complete annihilation of the Namibian peoples of Hereros and Nama during 1904-1908 by German colonial forces precedes the Armenian case.

² For details cf. **Boven Th. Van**, Paragraph 30: Note on the Deleted Reference to the Massacres of the Armenians in the Study on the Question of Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in: *A Crime of Silence: The Armenian Genocide; the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal*, London, 1985, pp. 168-172.

³ *A Crime of Silence*, p. 227.

⁴ **Suskunluk S.**, 1984 Paris Konferansı; Türklerin Ermenilere Uyguladığı Soykırımın Halkarın Daimi Mahkemesi’nde Görülen Davası. Çeviren: İsmail Toksoy, Zekiye Hasançebi, Ülkü Sağır. İstanbul, Pencere Yayınları, 2011.

as well as qualitatively the best researched case next to the genocide against the European Jews. However, open issues remain, and with the growing number of scholarly contributions interpretative and methodic contradictions also emerged.

Defining and avoiding the genocide term

Despite the fact that there exists only one internationally acknowledged legal definition of the crime of genocide, many scholars – historians as well as scholars of genocide – ignore the definition of the United Nations *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948), trying instead to develop their own definition and terminology. Subsequently the results are highly subjective, unmanageable and confusing. To start with, Raphael Lemkin, the Belarus born Jewish-Polish author of the UN Convention, developed in his monograph *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (1944) a definition which emphasizes that the crime in question consists in the destruction of national or ethnic collectives and is not limited to physical extermination, but has even more meaningful cultural, economic and social repercussions:

“By ‘genocide’ we mean the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. (...) Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. (...)”

Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization by the oppressor's own nationals”¹.

Related to the Armenian case, from Lemkin’s point of view it is not relevant whether small or high numbers of the victim group survive. Decisive is the fact that survivors could not freely survive as individuals with an Armenian identity. Developments in present Turkey indicate the continuity precisely of this genocidal effect².

¹ **Lemkin R.**, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress*, New Jersey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace - The Law book Exchange, Ltd., 2005, p. 79; it was originally published by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, at Washington D. C. in: 1944. - <http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/lemkin.html>

² A telling incident is the court case filed by Turkey’s previous president Gül against an MP of the oppositional Kemalist CHP party who had in a parliamentary debate alleged that Gül’s mother is of Armenian origin. Until today, the assumption of ‘being Armenian’ is considered to be a severe case of insult, as confirmed in an interview of 5 August with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; Erdoğan – then

The exclusion of other than national, ethnic, ‘racial’¹ or religious victim groups from the UN definition has caused many scholars to search for definitions that are more inclusive. In 1990, the US sociologist Helen Fein offered the following extensive definition that nevertheless emanates from the definition of the UN convention:

“Genocide is sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of threat offered by the victim”².

Other definitional extensions related to the crime itself; in this context, the US-scholar Rudolph Rummel suggested the term ‘democide’ for all crimes committed by a state against the people of this state³. Some scholars even question whether the application of the genocide term is useful at all. Relating to the earlier debate during the 1990’s between ‘structuralists’ and ‘intentionalists’ in genocide studies, the German historian Christian Gerlach criticized that the dominant application of the genocide term bases on the

“(…) idea of a homogenous, centralized and pre-planned massive crime (...). ‘Intent’ and often also ‘conspiracy’ (adopted from the Anglo-American theory of law) are thought to be constituent elements of genocide. But the concept of a monolithic criminal program is not corresponding with the more recent accentuation in science in which the extermination policy of the state is understood rather as process during which takes places in combination with certain societal developments”⁴.

Gerlach therefore suggests avoiding the term, adding to his objections the already mentioned observation on the utilitarianism of genocide scholarship in general:

“To speak about ‘genocide’ seems to be also dispensable, because only few scholars research on topics that are defined as genocide from a to a certain extent

PM – complained about the assumption of being of Armenian origin as ‘uglier’ and ‘dirtier’ than being of Georgian origin.

¹ Since contemporary scientists are not agreed on whether race is a valid way to classify people the term ‘racism’ has been either dropped in international legal definitions or extended in order to cover culturally based varieties of ‘racism’. The penalization of ‘racism’ includes genocide denial: On 28 November 2008, the Council of the European Commission adopted the Framework Decision on combating certain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law. The EU countries are subsequently obliged to combat, among others, the following offences: “publicly condoning, denying or grossly trivializing the crimes defined in Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal appended to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, as well as crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, when the conduct is carried out in a manner likely to incite violence or hatred against such a group or members of a group”. - http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/racism-xenophobia/framework-decision/index_en.htm

² **Fein H.**, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*, London, 1993, p. 24, *idem*: *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*, *Current Sociology*, 1990, 38, pp. 1-126.

³ **Rummel J. R.**, *Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900*, Charlottesville, 1997.

⁴ **Gerlach Ch.**, *Nationsbildung im Krieg: Wirtschaftliche Faktoren bei der Vernichtung der Armenier und beim Mord an den ungarischen Juden* [Nation Building during War: Economic factors in the destruction of the Armenians and the murder of the Hungarian Jews], in: **Kieser H.-L., Schaller D. J.** (Eds.), *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern und die Shoah – The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah*, Zürich, 2002, S. 351.

neutral interest in that phenomenon; in most cases they research, however, from an awareness of the tragedy of the victims”¹.

One cannot but agree with the conclusion that genocide studies are, for the emotional nearness of most scholars to victim groups and their interests, in particular challenged to maintain academic standards. Turkish scholars have named rather pedagogic and political reasons for the avoidance of the genocide term: Against the background of legal prosecution at least until 2008² and the persistent refusal by the Turkish legislator and state to acknowledge the deportations and massacres of 1915/1916 as a genocide, these scholars maintain that they must limit themselves to the task of describing and analyzing the crimes, whereas conclusions are left to their readers or audience. This dilemma reflects also in the title of a collective monograph which contains the results of nine years of joint ‘Turkish-Armenian workshop(s)’ (2002-2010) that brought together (mainly US-based) Turkish scholars of genocide, Armenian scholars of the Diaspora and scholars from some other countries; the editors’ choice of title – “A Question of Genocide” – has been explained by editors Ronald Suny and Fatma Müge Göçek with the difficulty of their task to find the lowest common denominator:

“The problem of the ‘G’ word is both definitional and political. Some of the participants hold that public acceptance of the term “genocide” would render them ineffective with the Turkish public. Others disagree with the standard United Nations definition of genocide. The New York University philosophy professor Paul Boghossian explored the imprecision and confusions of this official internationally accepted definition, but he noted that we all agreed that deportations and massacres had occurred; that they had been ordered, organized and carried out by the Young Turks and their agents; and that the target of these brutal policies had been defined ethno-religious groups (along with the Armenians, the Assyrians, and some other minorities as well). (...)

Acceptance of the events of 1915 as an instance of ethnic cleansing (...) is much less problematic (...). What remains open and in dispute for some, albeit a minority among scholars, is whether the murder of a nation in the case of the Armenians and Assyrians was intentional or an unfortunate consequence of a brutal program of deportations. (...) The title of this volume (...) reflects both the certainty of some and the ambiguity of others, not so much on the nature of killings, but how they might most convincingly be described”³.

It seems highly debatable whether the principle of finding the lowest common denominator is appropriate if applied to issues such as crimes against humanity (including genocide); finding the lowest common denominator is a method of diplomacy. Its conveyance into the sphere of science and in particular into the sphere of law – and being a crime, genocide is first a matter for jurists – seems not convincing. However, there exists a general defensive and minimalizing trend among the more current

¹ Ibid.

² The amendment of the notorious penal code paragraph 301 in that year brought certain mitigations, although not meeting the demands of national and international human rights NGOs to completely cancel the paragraph.

³ **Suny R. G., Göçek F. M. & Naimark, N. M.** (Eds.), *A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford, New York, 2011, pp. 9-10.

contributions to the research of the Armenian genocide. The search for the lowest common denominator by Turkish and other scholars who have opposing views on the nature of crimes under scrutiny is just one appearance of the same phenomenon.

Some scholars have suggested the replacement of the term genocide by other appellations, without so far convincing results. The German scholar Michael Schwartz who researched the compulsory migration processes of the XX century in the context of nation state building processes suggested “ethnic cleansing” as generic term for flight, expulsion, forced resettlement and deportation, which “(...) in the extreme case of massive murder could even include genocide”¹. As an internationally used term, “ethnic cleansing” emerged in 1992, from the earlier Serbian term “Етничко чишћење”, but has been first used by Russian military commanders during the genocidal expulsion of Circassians from the Northwest Caucasus in 1864 and before (“очищение”, “очищать” – “cleansing”, “clearance”, “to clear”)². Relying on a remarkably ample base of data, deriving since the Balkan Wars (1912/1913) that M. Schwartz described as the original “place of learning” of the crimes in question, the author suggests a typology of “ethnic cleansing” in which he, among others, places the deportations of Greeks during World War I as a case of “deportation without genocide”, in contrast to the Armenian case of a “deportation with genocide”³. My two main objections against his approach are the following: 1) As M. Schwartz realizes himself, the expression “ethnic cleansing” derives from the dehumanizing jargon of perpetrators, who deny the human nature of their victims by belittling them as “dirt” and “rubbish” that demands cleansing. Therefore, M. Schwartz proposes to use the term with quotation marks only. However, even with quotation marks the term lacks any juridical qualification and preciseness. Why should we replace internationally used and legally defined terms such as genocide, deportation or forced resettlement which in international law⁴ are qualified as “crimes against humanity” by a completely vague, unqualified slang noun whose usage depends from the perspective of genocide perpetrators? 2) The differentiation of the same crimes of deportation and massacres that had been committed in the course of the same case of national state building in Turkey as genocidal and non-genocidal does not stand to empirical and legal scrutiny. The massacres and deportations against the Orthodox Greek population of the Ottoman Empire before, during and after World War I qualitatively of same nature as the genocide, committed against the Armenian population of the same Ottoman state by the same perpetrators. As a result mainly of foreign relations, the difference between the Greek and the Armenian genocides is mainly quantitatively: It took the Young Turkish and Kemalist regimes ten years to “uproot” their Greek Orthodox

¹ **Schwartz M.**, *Ethnische “Säuberungen” in der Moderne: Globale Wechselwirkungen nationalistischer und rassistischer Gewaltpolitik im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert [Ethnic ‘Cleansings’ in Modern Times: Global Interactions of Nationalist and Racist Violence Policy]*, München, 2013, p. 4.

² *Cf.* citations of the military commander of the 1864 campaign, Count Nikolai Evdokimov in: **Richmond W.**, *The Circassian Genocide*, New Brunswick, NJ and London, 2013, p. 96 f.

³ **Schwartz M.**, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴ In article 7 of the Rome Statute (1998) of the International Criminal Court there are eleven offences described as “crimes against humanity”; *cf.* http://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aef7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf, p. 3.

compatriots, but just one and a half year to exterminate the Armenian population¹.

In difference to most scholars of genocide, historians seem generally to be less acquainted or bothered by legal definitions and juridical assessments. Instead, they develop their own personal and subjective definitions, risking, among others to disqualify the genocide claims of victim groups.

Intent and pre-mediation

Similar, but previously to Michael Schwartz, the German historian Boris Barth differentiated between the deportations and massacres of Ottoman Greeks and Ottoman Armenians. This scholar, who comes from a narrow concept of genocide, argues that only in the second case the crimes have been committed with intent. Although Barth is not a scholar of Ottoman or Greek history, he did not hesitate to jump to such far-reaching conclusions.

The question whether the genocide against the Ottoman Armenians was the result of intent or pre-mediation is at the core of the already mentioned division of scholars into “intentionalists” and oppositional “structuralists”; as a representative of the first approach, usually the senior Armenian scholar of genocide, Vahakn Dadrian, is mentioned, as critics of ‘intentionalism’ Ronald Suny, Donald Bloxham and Hilmar Kaiser. As the Swiss historian Hans-Lukas Kieser wrote in a review² of 2007, most scholars today adhere to the concept of the CUP’s “cumulative radicalization against the background of long-term ideological options”³.

Admittedly, in most cases genocidal intent is difficult to prove. This relates to the Ottoman genocide(s) as well as to the Holocaust; in general, the authors of massive crimes scarcely leave behind written confessions or instructions to kill. Furthermore, and as scholars of genocide have also pointed out, there is a discrepancy between the verbally articulated intent to kill and the real action. Representatives and functionaries of the *Committee for Union and Progress* (Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti – CUP) had announced their intent to exterminate the Greek Orthodox population of the Empire as early as 1909. The Balkan Wars and the experience of massive expulsion and flight of Ottoman Muslims multiplied these verbal genocidal announcements, which were mainly realized during the third and final phase of the Greek Genocide, 1919-1922.

The traditional chronology and interpretation of the genocide against the Armenians, as started during World War I by the German humanist theologian Dr Johannes Lepsius suggest that there was the articulated intent to kill and a premeditated plan to conduct the crime which both show in the sequence of measures that the CUP initiated already months before the Ottoman Empire officially joined the Great War in early November 1914: Search for allegedly illegal weapons in Armenian villages and quarters, combined with plunder, arson and rapes during terrifying

¹ **Hofmann T.**, Γενοκτονία ἐν Ποίη – Cumulative Genocide: The massacres and deportations of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire (1912-1923) in: **Hofmann T.**, **Bjørnlund M.** and **Meichanetsidis V.** (Eds.), *The Genocide of the Ottoman Greeks: Studies on the State Sponsored Campaign of Extermination of the Christians of Asia Minor (1912-1922) and Its Aftermath: History, Law, Memory*, New York, 2011, chapter “Comparing Genocides”, pp. 95-105.

² **Kieser H.-L.**, *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16: neueste Publikationen*. <http://aghet1915.wordpress.com/rezension/>

³ Ibid.

assaults on the residents; the destruction of the main political bodies of the victim group through the arrest of members and subsequent execution of the Marxist oppositional *Hnchak* party, which was in alliance with the CUP's political opponent, the *İtilaf* ("Entente") Party, in summer 1914, followed by the arrest of Dashnaks since March 1915 (although this socialist, but Non-Marxist Armenian party was in official alliance with the CUP, which is indicative for a "non-win situation" of the political Armenian activists); the "elitocide", or decapitation of the Ottoman Armenians through the massive arrest of the intellectual, economic and spiritual leadership since April 1915; the disarmament of Christian conscripts and their transfer into forced labor battalions since summer 1914; the deportation and dispersion of the unarmed and undefended remaining population in semi-desert areas where according to a revealing admission the Minister of the Interior, Mehmet Talat eleven months earlier¹ the survival of the Muslim deportees in question was hardly possible.

Since the early World War I documentations of Johannes Lepsius² and James Viscount Bryce³, these stages of destruction have ever since been explored and interpreted as a premeditated scheme that the CUP's Central Committee would conduct during World War I when the 'European War' distracted the attention of Britain, France and Russia as possible protectors of oriental Christians. Based on the "mass of material emanating from the Information Bureau of the Patriarchate of Constantinople", the most extensive documentation and treatise is that of Raymond Haroutioun Kévorkian⁴, who in the late 1990s was also the first scholar, who pointed out to the two-stage character of the extirpation of Ottoman Armenians: According to him, about 870,000 deportees arrived in Mesopotamia between summer and fall 1915, most of them being then interned in concentration camps near to the Baghdad railways, while a smaller percentage succeeded in staying in the cities of Aleppo, Dayr-az-Zawr, Ras-ul-Ayn, or Mosul. When in spring 1916 the responsible Aleppo based Sub-Directorate for Deportees realized that the concentration of surviving Armenian deportees in their 'area of settlement' was at many places higher than the intended dispersion limit of 10 percent of the overall population, it decided for renewed deportations and dispersal. During the second and third phases of the deportation further 630,000 further Armenians died between the fall of 1915 and 1916⁵, in particular since these measures hit a starving people which had by far not yet

¹ Statement during the parliamentary debate of 6 July 1914, after the Greek CUP member and deputy for Aydın, E. Emanuelidis, had expressed complaints about the settlement of Muslim refugees in Greek settlements and suggested the settlement of these Muslims in the area of Dayr-az-Zawr (Der-Zor) instead. – Cf. **Dündar F.**, Pouring a People into the Desert: The "Definitive Solution" of the Unionists to the Armenian Question, in: A Question of Genocide: Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire, p. 280.

² Lepsius, Johannes: Bericht über die Lage des armenischen Volkes in der Türkei [Report on the Situation of the Armenian People in Turkey]. (Potsdam 1916; further editions under the title Der Todesgang des Armenischen Volkes (Potsdam: Tempelverlag 1919; 1930; Heidelberg 1980 [Reprint]).

³ The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915-1916; Documents presented to Viscount Grey of Falladon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, by Viscount Bryce; with a preface by Viscount Bryce. London 1916. - <http://net.lib.byu.edu/~rdh7/wwi/1915/bryce/>

⁴ **Kévorkian R.**, Le génocide des Arméniens, Paris, 2006 (English edition: The Armenian Genocide: A Complete History, London, 2011, p. 811).

⁵ **Kévorkian R.**, Axes de déportation et camps de concentration de Syrie-Mésopotamie (1915-1916), in : L'extermination des déportés arméniens ottomans dans les camps de concentration de Syrie-

recovered from the first deportations few months ago. Kévorkian's findings are entirely in line with the estimates of contemporaries who already in 1915 had predicted that roughly more than the half of the deportees would perish en route¹. An early foreign estimate that has been based on an extrapolated survey by the Swiss Sister Beatrice Rohner and was communicated through the German Embassy to the German government, established in early October 1916 that out of 2.5 million Ottoman Armenians two million had been deported; of the deportees, 1.5 million had perished already by October 1916². In summer 1918, the Protestant pastor at the German Embassy of Constantinople, Count Siegfried von Lüttichau³, summarized the various contemporary German estimates as follows:

“It is of no significance whether the figure given for the total losses of the Armenians is placed at one million (Consul Rössler⁴) or two million (Christoffel⁵), because surely there was never really any authentic information concerning the figure for the size of the Armenian population. The figure cited by Preacher Ehmann⁶ in Mezré – 1 ½ million – is estimated as being the closest to the truth. Far more important than the total figure, which is hard to ascertain is the percentage determined in the individual areas. In the eastern provinces, that is excluding Constantinople, Smyrna, and other places in western Turkey, 80 – 90% of the entire population and 98% of the male population is no longer alive. These figures are probably correct. They can be checked town by town and correspond to my personal impression and observations. I met many boys and quite a few old men. I very seldom saw men at the height of their vigor, which stood out by their very existence. In Constantinople itself, almost all of the Armenians were spared; the same applied for Smyrna. On the other hand, they were driven out of almost all the smaller towns and villages in western

Mésopotamie (1915-1916) ; La deuxième phase du génocide, « Revue d'histoire arménienne contemporaine », numéro spécial, vol. II, 1998, pp. 60-61; *idem*: Le génocide des Arméniens, pp. 693-696.

¹ For example, **Wolfgang G.** (Ed.), *Der Völkermord an den Armeniern 1915/16: Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des deutschen Auswärtigen Amts*. Springe: VonKlampen!, 2005, S. 500.

² [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1916-10-04-DE-002](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1916-10-04-DE-002)

³ Siegfried Graf von Lüttichau (1877-1965), from 1907-1918 pastor at the German Embassy of Constantinople.

⁴ Walter Rössler (1871-1929); German consul at Aleppo from 27 May 1910 until 1918; in 1915 he financed with American support food supplies that were distributed among the deportees in Mesopotamia, but had to watch helplessly when the survivors of the first deportations were murdered during the second phase of extermination. The German Foreign Office did not allow Rössler to be a witness of the defense of Sogomon T'ehlerean during his Berlin trial of 2/3 June 1921.

⁵ Ernst Jacob Christoffel (1876-1955), since 1904 a German Protestant missionary in the Ottoman Empire; founder and director of *the Christian Mission in the Orient* (1904; renamed after Christoffel's death into *Christoffel Mission for the Blind* – Christoffel Blindenmission), which run a mission for the blind, deaf and otherwise handicapped in Malatya, where Christoffel stayed until World War I (1914), returning in early 1916 (until 1919, when the victorious Allies expelled all German citizens from the Ottoman Empire). In a letter of 26 March 1917 to Pastor G. Stoevesandt (Berlin) Christoffel estimated that the Armenian losses due to the deportation “exceeded one million”. This letter has been published by J. Lepsius in his 1919 edition of German diplomatic correspondence – *Cf. Deutschland und Armenien 1914-1918: Sammlung diplomatischer Aktenstücke*. Hrsg. u. eingel. von Johannes Lepsius, Potsdam, 1919 (Reprint Bremen 1986), p. 353 ff.

⁶ Johannes Ehmann, teacher, and representative of the *German Support Alliance for Christian Charity in the Orient* (Deutscher Hilfsbund für Christliches Liebeswerk im Orient) from 1896-1937 in the Ottoman Empire and later in Athens; director of the *Hilfsbund* orphanage at Kharberd (Harput)-Mezreh since 1896.

Turkey (for example, in Brusa [Bursa; TH], Ismid [Izmit; TH], Adapazar, Bardisag [Bardizag; TH], Jenidje [Yenice, district Çanakkale; TH] and others), in European Turkey out of Rodosto, Adrianople and so on, so that one may say that, taking into account the Armenians who were left in the capital, in total at least 80% of the population was annihilated. This does not exclude the Catholics and Protestants; rather, it includes them”¹.

The fact that nearly half of the 1915 deportees did survive, despite all hardships, is just but one reason why the above mentioned historian Christian Gerlach doubts that the deportations of 1915 served the pre-mediated aim of “murdering all Armenians”, relying on the “frequently obscure selection of victims for murder, the slightly less brutal treatment of Armenians from Central and Western Anatolia and most of all the quite inconsistent fate of women and children. (...) Between the rhetoric of annihilation of Ottoman or Young Turkish functionaries and factual complete annihilation there gaped a gap, despite all outrages and the systematic killing of hundreds of thousands”².

It is however difficult to agree with the far-reaching conclusions of Ch. Gerlach. The Turkey born scholar Fuat Dündar quotes an instruction of Minister Talat to the director of the *Commission for Abandoned Properties*, saying that the deportation has to be conducted as a “final solution of the Armenian Question”³. In consideration of all factual details it seems impossible not to see the numerous measures, taken by the Young Turkish regime as the consequence of a deliberate intention to risk as many Armenian lives as possible and thus to destroy them as a distinct socio-cultural collective in the main areas of their settlement – which would correspond precisely with the understanding of genocide that Raphael Lemkin developed on the empirical base of the Ottoman crimes and the Holocaust. The means toward that end were admittedly diversified, mainly in dependence on local, regional or temporary circumstances. Nevertheless, there prevails the impression of an overall methodic approach. It seems impossible not to conclude that political decision-makers who forcibly relocate an entire nation irrespectively to weather conditions and despite the conditions of war and starvation into an arid, thinly populated area had not calculated that a high percentage of the deported would not survive.

What was the purpose of such fatal decision? Already in the correspondence of the Ottoman Empire’s most important war ally, Germany, the officially given explanation of securing border areas and zones of war from an allegedly treacherous and unreliable population was questioned or dismissed in whole or at part⁴; the above

¹ [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1918-10-18-DE-001](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1918-10-18-DE-001)

² Gerlach Ch., op. cit., p. 358.

³ Dündar F., op. cit., p. 284.

⁴ In particular by the administrator of the German Consulate General at Erzurum, Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter, in his correspondence with the German Embassy at Constantinople; as early as mid-May 1915, Scheubner described the situation in the border province of Erzurum in the following way: “(...) With regard to the present situation here I would like to observe that a rebellion on the part of the Armenians in Erzurum and its surroundings is not expected, despite the negligible numbers of Turkish military forces in existence here. The Armenians living in areas near to the Russian border have long ago left their homelands; some of them fled to Russia where they are said to have joined the Russian troops – as was the case in Van – to fight against the Turks. Some of them came to Erzurum. Isolated incidents, such as armed resistance in the case of requisitions in far away villages, the killing of Turks who wanted

quoted Pastor Lüttichau emphasized the systematic nature of the Ottoman deportations as indicative for the “political measure by the government”, rejecting at the same time the notion of any major German responsibility:

“There is no doubt in my mind that an order was sent from Stambul, not in writing or by telegram, but orally through couriers with secret orders. I was told so accordingly in Malatia by Mustafa Agha¹, for example, who personally attended that infamous meeting in which a secret courier from Stambul brought the order to annihilate the deportees. The deportation was a military measure. The reason for this measure is known to everyone and certainly justified. But the annihilation of the deportees, which succeeded only too well and too thoroughly, was a political measure by the government. I am more certain of this than ever. The time had been chosen as well as possible. Battles were raging on the Dardanelles. It was a question of to be or not to be, not only for the Turks, but also for us. The German government was bound hand and foot, especially because at that time it was heavily indebted to Turkey, for it could not fulfil its promises as long as the path through the Balkans was not free, and Turkey had entered the war solely on the basis of these. Our representation in Constantinople did what it could, right up to the limit, yes, even beyond the limit of what was possible, if not to say permitted, in the national interest. Turkey acted in all consciousness, in a self-satisfied manner, without caring about the judgments of either friend or foe, and carried out what Abdul Hamid had wanted, but could not do at his

Armenian girls and women handed over to them, or the cutting and sabotaging of telegraph and telephone lines, and espionage are not unusual phenomena during a war in border areas containing mixed populations. (...)” - [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1915-05-15-DE-012](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1915-05-15-DE-012) Five days later, on 20 May 1915, von Scheubner-Richter reported to his embassy: “(...) as I have already emphasized to Your Excellency in my telegrams on this subject, this entire measure appears to be useless and unfounded. An uprising is not to be feared on the part of the local Armenians. In this, the local Armenians differ greatly from the Armenians in Van and its surroundings. They are not organized and also have no weapons. In addition, the male Armenian population between 17 and 48 has been enlisted in military service. Those who sympathized with Russia crossed the border long ago. Thus, this measure mainly affects women and children who are now, at the beginning of the rainy season, forced to leave their villages and, due to the lack of means of transportation, usually emigrate on foot to the Plain of Tercan, a journey of 6-8 days. They took their livestock with them, but had to leave their provisions of fodder behind, and these were immediately confiscated by the government. A part of the livestock being driven along will probably die due to the lack of fodder.

Thus, if the relocation measure appears to be useless, the way in which it is carried out is foolish. Accompanied by only a few gendarmes, the masses of evacuated Armenians march in a wide stream across the fields, which have been freshly tilled with great difficulty, and camp on them. The livestock grazes off all the seeds. Thus, a large part of the sown fields around Erzurum have been destroyed. Not only do the Armenians suffer from this, but also the Turks. A large part of the local large landowners are Turks. Their workers are Armenian. Their fields are sown by Armenians, now mostly by women. Many of the fields already sown will probably be lost due to the lack of workers. One of the results: the threat of starvation for the army and the population. Thus, the local Turkish merchants and landowners are also very dissatisfied about the relocation of the Armenians, if only for economic reasons.” - [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1915-05-20-DE-001](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1915-05-20-DE-001)

¹ Mustafa Ağa (Azizoglu), mayor of Malatya, who supported the missionary activities of Ernst Christoffel and had protected his Bethesda mission during the massacres of April 1909; in 1915 he tried to at least warn the substitute director of the Mission, Ernst Bauernfeind, who did not believe in Mustafa Ağa’s warnings. During the genocide, Mustafa Ağa saved several Armenian families by hiding them. In 1920, his own nationalist son Ekrem who axed his father while Mustafa Ağa was praying killed the admirable mayor. Cf. <http://www.aga-online.org/hero/mustafa-aga-azizoglu.php?locale=de><http://www.aga-online.org/hero/mustafa-aga-azizoglu.php?locale=de>

time. Everywhere on my journey I came to realize that this was a very systematic procedure, a methodicalness that was even more astonishing in this unmethodical country”¹.

Already contemporary observers disagreed about the scope of Turkish responsibility. According to Ernst Christoffel, the Turkish nation was not responsible for the crimes: “The Turkish people as such stood apart. Not even the entire Young Turkish Party was involved. Rather it is a small fraction inside this party, the so-called Panturkists, who have to be made responsible”². On the other hand, Armenian and Greek deputies of the Ottoman parliament, in particular deputies Nalbandyan and Emanuel Emanuelidis³, mentioned during the parliamentary debates of November and December 1918 the general co-responsibility of the Muslim population: As a main reason for the criminal politics of the war regime they saw the Islamic law and its influence on the attitude of Muslims towards Non-Muslims, which has been shaped by both Pan-Islamist and Turkist policy to rid Anatolia of Christians⁴.

This observation of the religiously motivated involvement of the Ottoman Muslim population intersects with the question about the religious factor in the destruction of Armenians, Greeks and Aramaic speaking Christians during 1912-1922. Under Ottoman rule, the indigenous Christian populaces received the inferior status of *dhimmi*, or “wards”, whose religion was largely tolerated, albeit never accepted on equal terms, as compared with Islam as the ruling religion. Bat Ye’or⁵, the Jewish-British expert on *dhimmitude*, discusses the notion of tolerance highly critically, pointing out to massacres, deportations, compulsory Islamization, enslavement and the *devşirme* system⁶ as routine treatment of the submitted Non-Muslim majorities⁷. She characterized the Armenian genocide as “the natural outcome of a policy that was inherent of the politico-religious structure of the dhimmi system. This practice of physical eradication of a rebellious people had already been practiced against the Slavonic and Greek Christians; these escaped annihilation only by the sometimes-reluctant intervention of the Europeans”⁸.

How do such findings fit into the picture of the Armenian genocide as a “modern crime” of nation state building, as the vast majority of scholars today perceive it? The explanation lies perhaps in the compatibility and simultaneity of “modern”, because

¹ [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1918-10-18-DE-001](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1918-10-18-DE-001)

² **Christoffel E.**, *Aus dunklen Tiefen: Erlebnisse eines deutschen Missionars in Türkisch-Kurdistan während der Kriegsjahre 1916-1918*, Berlin-Friedenau, 1921, p. 67.

³ Deputy for the Ionian province of Aydın and CUP member.

⁴ **Akçam T.**, *Armenien und der Völkermord: Die Istanbuler Prozesse und die türkische Nationalbewegung*, Hamburg, 1996, S. 86.

⁵ Bat Ye’or (“Daughter of the Nile”) is a pseudonym of Gisèle Littman (born Orebie in Egypt).

⁶ Alternatively “boy gathering”: The “taxation” of submitted Christian majorities on the Balkans and then in Anatolia who had to hand over every fifth son to Ottoman authorities; the boys were Islamized and educated in a transnational milieu in order to alienate them from their Greek, Armenian or other Christian origins. Most would then serve in the Ottoman forces, while few made carriers in the Ottoman administration or even at the Sultan’s court.

⁷ **Bat Ye’or**, *Der Niedergang des orientalischen Christentums unter dem Islam: 7.-20. Jahrhundert* (The decline of the oriental Christianity under Islam: 7.-20. Centuries), 2nd ed., Gräfelfing, 2005, pp. 276-280.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

nationalistic motifs, and pre-modern methods of extermination that resembled those of traditional *jihad*, according to Bat Ye'or:

The genocide of the Armenians was a *jihad*: Raya [‘the herd’; Non-Muslims; TH] were not involved. Although many Muslim Turks and Arabs disapproved of this crime, and refused to participate, it must be noted: These massacres were perpetrated solely by Muslims and they alone profited from the booty – the possession of the victims, their homes, their fields, which were left to the Muhajiroun [Muslim refugees; settlers; TH], and the allocation of enslaved women and children. The selection of the boys from the age of twelve was in line with the rules of *jihad* – from that age the *jizya* must be paid. The four stages of the liquidation – deportation, enslavement, forced conversion, and massacre – reflect the historical circumstances in which the *jihad* since the 7th century was conducted in the Dar al-Harb¹ [‘the House of War’, i.e. Non-Muslim countries; TH]².

Reasons and scope of destruction

German diplomats of the World War I period understood that the true aim of their Ottoman allies was to rid the country of its Christian population in the name of ethno-religious homogenization; as early as 17 June 1915 Ambassador von Wangenheim sent the following information to his government:

“It has come to light that the banishment of the Armenians is not only motivated by military considerations. The Minister of the Interior, Talat Bey, recently spoke about this without reservation to D^r Mordtmann, who is currently employed by the Imperial Embassy. He said ‘that the Porte is intent on taking advantage of the World War in order to make a clean sweep of internal enemies – the indigenous Christians – without being hindered in doing so by diplomatic intervention from other countries. Such an undertaking will serve the interest of the Germans, the Allies of Turkey, which thus in turn could be strengthened’ ”³.

In his summarizing conclusions of 1918, the Embassy’s pastor Lüttichau confirmed Wangenheim’s early assessment, at the same time including even Muslim victims of the Young Turkish policies and purposeful neglect:

“Actually, all non-Turks in the Ottoman Empire share the fate of the Armenians: the Syrians [Syriacs; TH] in Mesopotamia, the Druses in the Lebanon, the Greeks along the coastlines, the Kurds in their wonderful mountains, yes, even the Arabs. Yet we have still not reached the end of the tragedy that took place in this country during the war. Who has counted the hundreds of thousands of Turkish soldiers and, lately, the Turkish emigrants as well who died, not actually because of the war, but because of indifference, unscrupulousness and lack of order, and are continuing to die every day, even though they are Mohammedans? There is not a single country among the powers at war that has actually suffered such a dreadful loss of human lives, as has

¹ In Muslim legal theory, humanity is divided into the ‘House of Islam’ and the non-Muslim ‘House of War’. The relationship of both spheres is hostile, until the defeated Non-Muslims are forced to submission and pay the *jizya*.

² Bat Ye’or, op. cit., p. 221.

³ PA/AA, I A Türkei 183, Armenien Bd. 37, Microfiche n° 7122. - [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1915-06-17-DE-003](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1915-06-17-DE-003)

Turkey, not just proportionately, but in absolute figures. And the end is not yet in sight. On the other hand, there is not a country on the continent among the powers at war that is so rich in everything, literally everything, that is necessary for life, raw materials and food, that it could be completely independent, as is the case for Turkey. It is just this contrast that is so terrible. The attentive observer can see it in little things every day in shocking images on the streets”¹.

In recent scholarship prevails the view that the Ottoman Christian population and in particular the Ottoman Armenians fell victim to a policy that was caused by demographic “engineering” to stabilize the collapsing empire by ethnic, or rather ethno-religious homogenization, i.e. Turkification and Islamization (in the ruling Sunni version of Islam). The means were linguistic and religious assimilation, dispersion of ethno-religious agglomerations by resettlement and physical destruction of those groups that were perceived as resistant to assimilation, such as the Christian denominations with their century old, set traditions and cultural identities. The remodelling of the Ottoman society is explained by most scholars as a result of Turkish nation state building processes that included a paradigm shift among the economic elites². The abolition of Greek and Armenian leadership in Ottoman finance and industry has largely been achieved through brutal boycotts and restrictions that resemble in many aspects those of the subsequent anti-Jewish Nazi measures of the 1930’s. In the Ottoman Empire, anti-Christian boycotts had been announced as early as 1909 and were predominantly directed against the Orthodox Greek population during their early stage; since the Balkan Wars of 1912/1913, the restrictions were rapidly increased and extended. In the CUP pamphlet “A Way of liberation for Muslims”, published in 1913 we read, “Oh my God, how are we going to celebrate the day on which Turks and Muslims buy things from each other only and consume the goods produced in Turkey as much as possible. (...) The most important task is to consume Turkish products as much as possible”³. The young Turkish journalist Munis Tekinalp (Moise Cohen; 1833-1961) rejoiced in his pamphlet “Türkismus und Pantürkismus”⁴ that the boycott movement “had ruined hundreds of Greek and Armenian tradesmen”⁵. However, the dispossession of Christian deportees throughout World War I served not only the replacement of the previous economic Non-Muslim elite by Muslims, but also financed the settlement of Muslim refugees (*muhacirler*) from the Balkans and the deportation of Christians respectively. Another significant purpose of this “mass murder and robbery” (“Massenraubmord”; Christian Gerlach)

¹ [http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/\\$\\$AllDocs/1918-10-18-DE-001](http://www.armenocide.net/armenocide/armgende.nsf/$$AllDocs/1918-10-18-DE-001)

² For the description in a contemporary travelogue cf. **Stürmer H.**, *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel; Skizzen deutsch-jungtürkischer Moral und Politik* [Two War Years in Constantinople: Sketches of German-Young Turkish moral and politics], Lausanne, 1917; for an early study cf. **Indžikjan O. G.**, *The Bourgeoisie of Ottoman Empire*, Yerevan, 1977 (in Russian); for recent analyses: **Göçek F. M.**, *Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernization and Social Challenge*, New York, 1996; *The Transformation of Turkey: Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era*. London, New York, 2011; **Üngör U. Ü., Polatel M.**, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Seizure of Armenian Property*, London, New York, 2011.

³ **Üngör/Polatel**, op. cit., p. 62.

⁴ **Tekinalp M.**, *Türkismus und Pantürkismus* [Turkism and Pan-Turkism], Weimar, 1915.

⁵ Quoted from: **Üngör/Polatel**, op. cit., p. 63.

was to financially buy the loyalty of the Muslim population to local or regional CUP leaders and representatives¹.

Legal Aftermath

With their bilateral Treaty of Lausanne (30 January 1923) Turkey and Greece decided the compulsory ‘population exchange’ of approximately 2 million people, the majority of them Ottoman nationals of Greek-Orthodox religion. Turkey had eventually achieved its goal of a near-to-complete de-Christianization of its territories. In his opening address to the first session of the Grand National Assembly on 23 August 1923, Mustafa Kemal welcomed as a special achievement the ‘uprooting’ of the Greeks of Pontos². On the same day, the Turkish parliament approved the multilateral Peace Treaty of Lausanne (24 July 1923), in which the signatories had acknowledged in retrospect the expulsion and other massive crimes that preceded the asymmetric Greek-Turkish ‘population exchange’.

Already at the time of its ratification the Lausanne Treaty violated existing international law, in particular the First and Second Hague Conventions on war laws and war crimes (1899, 1907), which prohibit expulsion. Under the criteria of recent international law, the Treaty represents a blatant violation of internationally acknowledged rights of minorities to be protected from discrimination, oppression and mass murder; it furthermore violates the internationally acknowledged right to home. Despite all this, the already committed crimes of Turkey received in retrospect the sanctioning of the signatories of the subsequent multilateral Peace Treaty of Lausanne (23 July 1923)³.

¹ “(...) the great unintended consequence of the Young Turk government’s dispossession of Armenians was the opportunity it offered local Turks for self-enrichment. To the Interior ministry this was not acceptable and was not accepted; individual embezzlers were punished by having their rights to Armenian property revoked. Those with ties to local Young Turk party bosses or enough social status and potential to mobilize people, got away with their ‘crime within a crime’. One can perhaps even conclude that the Young Turk government bought the domestic loyalty of the Turkish people through these practices – initially irresponsible, then outright criminal. The Armenian genocide was a form of state formation that married certain classes and sectors of Ottoman society to the state. It offered those Turks a fast track to upward social mobility. So the knife had cut both ways, for the Young Turk movement represented the drive to couple social equality with national homogeneity and political purity”. – **Üngör/Polatel**, op. cit., p. 105.

² According to a report from Ankara by the French colonel Moquin, quoted from **Tsirkinidis H.**, “At last we uprooted them...”: The Genocide of Greeks of Pontos, Thrace and Asia Minor, through the French archives. Thessaloniki, 1999, p. 300.

³ Similar to previous bilateral Ottoman treaties, in particular the Ottoman-Bulgarian treaty of 1913, the multilateral Lausanne treaty acknowledges the “(...) expulsion and liquidation of millions of people in the name of a dubious “national rebirth”, conducted by a dominant elite at the expense of minorities. There was no longer any talk about the return of Armenian refugees and the establishment of justice. Furthermore the treaty contained a Greek-Turkish population exchange which in its large scale was the first one of that kind, thus legalising an already established ‘ethnic cleansing’. With regards to talks about Kurdish, Armenian and Greek minorities in his country Dr Rıza Nur, the general secretary of the Turkish delegation to the conference, noted, that ‘these alien elements are a bother and microbes’ and that one has to ‘cleanse the Kurds by means of an assimilation program from the alien language and race’”. See Rıza Nur, *Hayat ve Hatiratım*, Vol. 2, Istanbul, 1992, p. 260; quoted from: **Kieser H.-L.**, Armeniermord und Diplomatie: Von der Lästigkeit vertuschter Geschichte. “*Traverse: Zeitschrift für Geschichte*”, 2002-2, pp. 131-142; for the Ottoman-Bulgarian Peace Treaty cf. **Schwartz M.**, Die Balkankriege 1912/13:

For the Jewish-Polish jurist and historian Raphael Lemkin the Ottoman genocide(s) became the incentive for his abortive attempt to introduce into the *League of Nations* already in 1933 a bill for an international convention that would penalize massive crimes against ethnic and religious collectives – not only under conditions of war and foreign occupation, but also, as in the Ottoman case, when committed against the own subjects. In his criticism of the Nuremberg Tribunal Lemkin pointed out to the fact that the existing international law with its focus on war crimes was much too. In 1942, during the World War II and Holocaust that wiped out Lemkin’s own family he named such crimes by his own innovative term: “genocide”. At several occasions Lemkin related to the extermination of Ottoman Christians for the definition of genocide that subsequently, together with the extermination of the European Jewry, forms the empirical base of the UN *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide* (1948): Four out of the five crimes that the UN Convention defines as genocide, are typical for the Ottoman cases.

The Berlin court trial of the 2nd and 3rd June 1921 on the Armenian assassinator of Mehmet Talat, Soğomon T’ehlerean (1897-1960), became an eye-opener not only for the young R. Lemkin, who learnt as a student about it from the contemporary print media, when studying linguistics at the University of Lwów (Ukrainian: Lviv; Russian: Lvov). In his autobiography, Lemkin describes the Berlin trial of S. T’ehlerean as a key incentive in Lemkin’s lifelong fight for the penalization and prevention of the crime of genocide:

“The court in Berlin acquitted Tehlirian. It decided that he had acted under ‘psychological compulsion.’ Tehlirian, who upheld the moral order of mankind, was classified as insane, incapable of discerning the moral nature of his act. He had acted as the self-appointed legal officer for the conscience of mankind. But can a man appoint himself to mete out justice? Will not passion sway such a form of justice and make a travesty of it? At that moment, my worries about the murder of the innocent became more meaningful to me. I didn’t know all the answers, but I felt that a law against this type of racial or religious murder must be adopted by the world.

At Lwów University (...) I discussed this matter with my professors. They evoked the argument about sovereignty of states. ‘But sovereignty of states’, I answered, ‘implies conducting an independent foreign and internal policy, building of schools, construction of roads, in brief, all types of activity directed toward the welfare of people’. Sovereignty, I argued, ‘cannot be conceived as the right to kill millions of innocent people’. (...)

In Paris, Shalom Schwarzbard, a Jewish tailor whose parents had perished in a pogrom in Ukraine in 1918, shot the Ukrainian minister of war, Symon Petljura, a man generally blamed for the massacres. Like Tehlirian before him, Schwarzbard was put on trial. (...) The Paris jury found itself in the same moral dilemma as the court in Berlin. They could neither acquit Schwarzbard nor condemn him. (...) The ingenious legal minds found a compromise similar to that in the trial of Tehlirian: ‘The perpetrator is insane and therefore must go free’. (...) Gradually, the decision was maturing in me that I had to act”¹.

Kriege und Vertreibungen in Südosteuropa. “Militärsgeschichte: Zeitschrift für historische Bildung”, 2008, n° 2, p. 9 <http://www.hist.net/kieser/mak4/TraverseDebate.html#fn7>

¹ Ibid. pp. 20-21.

The German Jewish jurist Robert Max Wassili Kempner¹ (1899-1993), who in difference to Lemkin did attend as a young law student the proceedings, drew similar far-reaching conclusions. After a successful career as a lawyer and chief legal advisor of the Prussian police, he was compelled to emigrate to the U.S.A. after his German citizenship was revoked in 1935. Being most familiar with the German law system, he became an assistant U.S. chief counsel during the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. In 1980, Kempner recalled the Berlin trial of 1921 as a highly relevant turning point in law history:

“The murder of 1.4 million Christian Armenians on order of the Turkish government was the first genocide program of this century. (...) The deed of the Armenian student Teilirian drew the world’s attention to a particular significant development in international law: After the Armenian atrocities had started during the First World War, courageous men stood up who in the interest of humanity publicly declared against this genocide. They did not let themselves adhere by the stupid thesis that a foreign state would be not allowed to interfere into the domestic affairs of another sovereign state. (...) The road from this Holocaust with at least 1.4 million Armenian victims to the Holocaust of six million Jews lasted only twenty years”².

Whereas the comments of Lemkin and Kempner saw the main impact of the Berlin proceeding in the progress that they brought for the prevention of massive state crimes, other contemporaries drew opposite conclusions: Hitler, who was in 1921 in Berlin, together with his senior advisor, the Armenophile German conservative Max Erwin von Scheubner-Richter³, who apparently molded Hitler’s interpretation of the Armenian genocide. For his fear that the Germans could eventually end as the Armenians, Hitler advocated for a radical solution of the ‘Jewish Question’ and mentioned already in late 1922: “A solution of the Jewish Question has to come. (...) either the German people become a people as the Armenians (...), or a bloody confrontation will come”⁴. Similar to his Turkish predecessor in genocide, Talat⁵, Hitler decided for “preventive genocide”.

¹ In 1947, Kempner was also the finder of the so-called Wannsee Protocols, a critical historical document in the history of the Jewish Holocaust.

² **Kempner R. M. W.**, *Vor sechzig Jahren vor einem deutschen Schwurgericht: Der Völkermord an den Armeniern*. “Recht und Politik”, 1980, 3, pp. 167-168.

³ As administrator at the German general-consulate of Erzurum, von Scheubner-Richter became an important eyewitness of the Armenian genocide in this large border province of the Ottoman Empire. In his numerous communications to the German Embassy at Constantinople, he contradicted among other the official Ottoman version of an alleged Armenian rebellion, at least for the province of Erzurum. *Cf.* footnote 41.

⁴ Quoted from the biographical sketch “Mehmet Talat – a figure of identification?” of Hans-Lukas Kieser, hold on 18 March 2006 in Berlin-Charlottenburg at the University of Arts during the meeting “Difficulties of Remembrance: The Genocide against the Armenians”.

⁵ The Turkish nationalist author and activist Halidé Edip Adıvar quotes Talat with the following statement for the “preventive” destruction of Ottoman Armenians and Greeks: “Look here, Halidé Hanum. I have a heart as good as yours, and it keeps me awake at night to think of human suffering. But that is a personal thing, and I am here on this earth to think of my people and not of my sensibilities. If a Makedonian or an Armenian leader gets the chance and the excuse, he never neglects it. There was an equal number of Turks and Moslems massacred during the Balkan War, yet the world kept a criminal silence. I have the conviction that as long as a nation does the best for its own interests, and succeeds, the world admires it and thinks it moral. I am ready to die for what I have done, and I know that I shall die for it”. **Edib Halidé Adıvar**, *Memoirs of Halidé Edib*, Piscataway, NJ, 2005, p. 387.

Despite the impact that the Ottoman genocide left in the international law sphere, the legislative and executive bodies of the Turkish Republic continue to deny that there was ever a genocidal intent against the indigenous Christian peoples of Asia Minor and North Mesopotamia. Instead, Turkish political leaders and opinion-leaders continuously point to alleged high treason and secessionism as justification for the illegal deportation of Christian populaces and the massive killings of Christian Ottoman subjects. However, official Turkish denial, minimization and attempted justification of historic facts transferred the issue to international levels, after descendants of genocide survivors sought the acknowledgement of the Ottoman genocide by national and international legislative bodies. Started by the Armenian Diasporas in 1965, such “recognition” initiatives have resulted in resolutions and laws by so far 21 national bodies. On international levels and since 1987, the European Parliament has issued four resolutions in which it calls on Turkey to recognize the genocide against the Armenians and come to terms with its past. In the last of these resolutions, adopted on 29 September 2006, the European Parliament included as co-victims the ‘Greeks of Pontos’ and the ‘Assyrians’¹.

A year later, on 15 December 2007 the largest academic body of genocide studies, the *International Association of Genocide Scholars* (IAGS) adopted a resolution, issued by scholar Adam Jones, in which it recognized the cases of the “Assyrians” and Greeks as genocide².

The Armenian Genocide: A Case of lasting injustice?

In a joint statement of 24 May 1915, the Entente states Britain, France and Russia threatened the Ottoman government to hold each of its members personally responsible for the crimes committed against the Ottoman Armenians³. When Allied victory brought the opportunity after the Ottoman war capitulation of Mudros, national

¹ The according part of the resolution reads: “(...) 56. [The European Parliament] Takes note of the proposal by Turkey to establish a committee of experts which should be under the auspices of the United Nations in order to overcome the tragic experience of the past, and the position of Armenia regarding that proposal; urges both the Turkish Government and the Armenian Government to continue their process of reconciliation leading to a mutually acceptable proposal; welcomes the fact that, with the recent debates in Turkey, a start at least has been made in the discussion on the painful history with Armenia; stresses that, although recognition of the Armenian genocide as such is formally not one of the Copenhagen criteria, it is indispensable for a country on the road to membership to come to terms with and recognize its past; calls in this respect on the Turkish authorities to facilitate the work of researchers, intellectuals and academics working on this question, ensuring them access to the historical archives and providing them with all relevant documents; urges Turkey to take the necessary steps, without any preconditions, to establish diplomatic and good neighborly relations with Armenia, to withdraw the economic blockade and to open the land border at an early date, in accordance with resolutions adopted by the European Parliament between 1987 and 2005, thereby fulfilling the Accession Partnership priorities and the requirements of the Negotiating Framework on 'peaceful settlement on border disputes' which are both mandatory for EU accession; believes that a similar position should be adopted for the cases of other minorities (e.g. the Greeks of Pontos and the Assyrians). (...)”.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2006-0381&language=EN&ring=A6-2006-0269>

² Cf. http://www.aga-online.org/news/attachments/IAGS_Resolution.pdf

³ For the full text cf. http://www.armenian-genocide.org/Affirmation.160/current_category.7/affirmation_detail.html

interests in Near East territories and resources were stronger than the joint efforts to call to justice the perpetrators of the Ottoman World War I genocide(s). Instead of an international tribunal Ottoman Court Martials tried to juridically deal with the country's criminal past, however, and in most cases in the absence of the defendants, who could escape to Germany and other countries, or into the realm of the nationalist counter-government that Mustafa Kemal established in Sivas, then Ankara after May 1919. The failure of justice both on international and national levels led to the emergence of the clandestine *Vrez* organization and Armenian assassinations of the political leaders of the Young Turkish war regime during 1921/1922. After World War II, the Armenian genocide was not only a “cold” or unsolved case of genocide, but had fallen into near-to complete oblivion.

Starting in April 1965 and with the 50th anniversary of commemoration matters began gradually to change: in Soviet Armenia and in the Diaspora movements of protest challenged the international oblivion with their demands for justice (“հայ դատ” – “Armenian Court”) and – predominantly in the Soviet Armenian protest movement – for the recognition of territorial losses (“մեր հողերը!” – “our lands!”), which RA president Serzh Sargsyan has classified as “patricide”. In the absence of international court rulings on the Armenian genocide, international and national legislative and executive bodies were confronted with the demand to “acknowledge” the Armenian genocide as a crime corresponding with the United Nations *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide*. Since 1965 and starting with Uruguay, 21 national parliaments issued resolutions and/or laws in which the Armenian genocide was classified as genocide. The only exception here is the 2005 non-legislative motion of the German parliament (“Bundestag”) under the heading *Remembering and commemorating the expulsions and massacres of the Armenians in 1915 - Germany must make a contribution to reconciliation between Turks and Armenians*¹. In this extensive statement, the German legislator admitted the German obligation to confront Germany's “responsibility”: “This includes supporting the Turks and Armenians in their efforts to overcome the rifts of the past and find paths towards reconciliation and understanding”².

The wording of the motion clearly avoids any legal qualification of the crimes of expulsions (in the text also referred to as “deportations”) and massacres and only quotes the term genocide as the mainstream opinion in academia as well as in external politics: “Numerous independent historians, parliaments and international organizations describe the expulsion and annihilation of Armenians as genocide”³.

Such avoidance of a precise own opinion is a rather strange approach by a legislator who knows very well and from own experience about the difficulties to gain “reconciliation and understanding” of survivors of genocide and their descendants. The German legislative and executive must know that only an unequivocal legal qualification creates the necessary pre-condition for both. However and in striking contrast to their in the case of the Holocaust, German political decision-makers preferred not to articulate an own position, not only on the Armenian genocide, but

¹ http://www.aga-online.org/news/attachments/BundestagResolution_en.pdf

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

also on the 1904-1908 German genocide in Namibia. Subsequently, the decision, whether the ‘deportations and massacres’ of the Armenians represent a genocide, is left to the interested sides in question: Armenians and Turks, or the states that claim to represent them. With its 2005 motion, Germany has limited its mediatory commitment to the financing of all kinds of bi-national meetings, events, and joint Turkish-Armenian ventures under the label of a fictitious “Armenian-Turkish dialogue”. The position of the German executive is even less compromising, than that of the legislative: In 2010, the Foreign Office replied to a parliamentary inquiry on the position of the Federal Government with regards to the Armenian Genocide that in the face of pending court cases in the US for reparations against German institutions the German government did not want to comment¹. According to the German Federal Government, solely Armenia and Turkey must answer the question whether or not the events of 1915 qualify as genocide according to the UN Convention in their mutual dialogue on history.

In a more recent statement of 2013 the ruling conservative party *Christian-Democrat Union (CDU)* replied to the Germany based human rights NGO *Working Group Recognition – Against Genocide, for International Understanding*² that had requested all parliamentary parties to answer four questions on their position in history and memory politics:

“CDU and CSU³ know about the fact that still at the eve of the World War I a quarter of the population on the territory of recent Turkey believed into Christianity. Cities such as Istanbul and Smyrna (Izmir) were predominantly Christian. There existed thousands of churches in Anatolia and dozens of episcopal seats of the Greek, Armenian and Syriac churches. Today Turkey has a population of 78 million, but less than one hundred thousand Christians, even if all denominations are counted together. The protraction and the genocide of the Armenians in 1915 which is denied in its dimension until today by the Turkish government, the persecution of Aramaic Christians of the various Syriac denominations and the Greek-Turkish population exchange according to the peace treaty of Lausanne of 1923 did considerably diminish the number of Christians. Also events such as the Cyprus crisis added to the emigration of Christians”⁴.

This may sound in Armenian ears more comforting than any previous German governmental statement, because this time the CDU/CSU parties did use the term of genocide (“Völkermord” in German) to qualify the crimes committed against the

¹ Letter of the German Foreign Office to the president of the German parliament, 1 June 2010, p. 5, published on http://www.aga-online.org/downloads/de/news/attachments/Antwort_Bundesregierung_Kleine_Anfrage_Linksfraktion_01062010.pdf

² Founded in Yerevan in 2003 predominantly by German citizens; acknowledged as an association under German association law in January 2004. The author of this contribution is a founding member and since 2004 chairperson of AGA.

³ Christian Social Union is the “sister party” of CDU in the independent Land Bavaria. CDU and CSU are coalition parties.

⁴ Antworten der Christlich-Demokratischen Union Deutschlands (CDU) und der Christlich-Sozialen Union in Bayern (CSU) auf die Fragen der Arbeitsgruppe Anerkennung – gegen Genozid, für Völkerverständigung e. V. (AGA) [Responses of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian-Social Union (CSU) to the questions of the Working Group Recognition – Against Genocide, for International Understanding (AGA)], 2013, p 2. - http://www.aga-online.org/news/attachments/AGA_Wahlpruefsteine_2013_Erinnerungspolitik_CDU.pdf

Ottoman Armenians. Nevertheless, in the following paragraphs CDU/CSU doubted the effectiveness of any official recognition for which the *Working Group Recognition* (AGA) thrives since its foundation in the year 2003:

“However it remains debatable whether an official qualification as genocide of those terrible events by the German Bundestag will enhance a process of reconciliation between Armenians and Turks and will promote the historical processing in Turkey. This decision demands a profound examination. But this does not change the principal evaluation that in 1915 genocide had been committed against the Arameans (sic!)¹, and that the human rights of other Christian groups were likewise massively violated”².

The German scholar of political sciences, Yvonne Robel has researched comparatively the official German position in history politics toward the three cases of Holocaust, Namibia and Armenia. Robel describes the official German position as a (so far successful) attempt to ‘neutralize’ the German role in the Armenian genocide by emphasizing the sole jurisdiction of the Turkish and Armenian states. At the same time, the German government had transformed the ‘Armenian Question’ from a pending juridical issue into an unsolved informal historic debate:

“To see the actual German role in particular in mediation implies at the same time the ‘outsourcing’ of the history political jurisdictions (to the Turkish and the Armenian state). This is also illustrated by the substantiation with which die Federal Government rejected the recognition intention of PDS³ in 2001 and 2002. In both cases the responsive writing mentioned, ‘that the question of assessing the massacres of the Armenians is basically a historical question and hence subject of historiography, and in the first place a matter of the countries concerned, Armenia and Turkey.’ The jurisdiction of the Bundestag for an official recognition of the genocide was subsequently rejected”⁴.

It is unimaginable that the German government would ever suggest that Jewish organizations or the state of Israel together with deniers of the Holocaust achieve a discourse in which they decide about the assessment of ‘events’. In the case of the genocide against the Armenians and despite the German legislators’ admission of German responsibility in it the German government chose to limit itself to mediation and the recommendation of joint Turkish-Armenian commissions on history despite the fact that such strategies have been heavily criticized in the Armenian Diaspora as well as in Armenia.

Already at the time of the first petition for the recognition of the Armenian genocide by the Bundestag the *Working Group Recognition* had in April 2000 addressed to the German legislator by reminding the members of parliament about their responsibility not only in the face of German co-responsibility of the crimes, but

¹ Probably the author of this text confused Arameans and Armenians, meaning the latter.

² Antworten der Christlich Demokratischen Union..., op. cit., http://www.aga-online.org/news/attachments/AGA_Wahlpruefsteine_2013_Erinnerungspolitik_CDU.pdf

³ PDS – Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). However, in 2001 AGA and not PDS was the petitioner for recognition.

⁴ **Robel Y.**, Verhandlungssache Genozid: Zur Dynamik geschichtspolitischer Deutungskämpfe, München, 2013, p. 245.

also with regard to the current Turkish and Armenian communities residing in Germany:

“The Federal Republic of Germany is home to the largest Turkish diaspora community and of German citizens of Armenian descent. On their behalf, the signatories address to the Federal President as well as to the president and members of the German Bundestag:

- Do accept the fact of the Armenian genocide! Follow the example of international and national bodies: the World Council of Churches, the European Parliament, the UN Human Rights Commission, the parliaments and senates of Argentina, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Canada, Lebanon, of the Russian Federation, Sweden, Uruguay, USA and Cyprus. In addition, Pope John Paul II has condemned the genocide against the Armenians.
- Request the Government and the legislature of the Republic of Turkey to recognize the historical fact of this genocide and thus to satisfy the precondition that the European Parliament with its adopted on June 18, 1987, “Resolution on the political Solution of the Armenian Question” has “made on the full membership of Turkey”! You will directly enhance to restore justice for the descendants of the victims! You will help to break the cycle of crime, impunity and repetition that the 20th Century made the century of genocide”¹.

Fourteen years have passed, before a regional German Minister recently mentioned in an interview that the time might have come to incorporate other cases of genocide than the Holocaust into the curricula of school teaching of history. Against the background of increasing numbers of pupils from migrant families in Germany, the Minister for school education in the Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, Sylvia Löhrmann, supports the concept of ‘Remembrance for Future’. It incorporates the examples for genocide awareness education not only from the Holocaust and Europe, but also from regions and societies that are more recent or more familiar to the young immigrants or descendants of immigrants: Ruanda, Darfur, Srebrenica (Bosnia) or “the suffering of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire”². In this context, S. Löhrmann advocated the confrontation with one’s own history, which for young people from Turkish or Kurdish backgrounds would be the genocide of the Armenians.

In conclusion:

Where do we stand one hundred years after the genocide against the Ottoman Armenians? This necessarily brief analysis has led to the conclusion that despite much quantitative and some qualitative progress in genocide research there remain several profound unsolved or debated issues, including the danger of denying or minimizing genocidal intent and pre-mediation, which is a legal key determinant of the crime of genocide.

There is even less progress in the sphere of judicial or legislative condemnation. National legislators of today hesitate more than ever to qualify the “deportation and

¹ http://www.aga-online.org/documents/attachments/aga_02.pdf

² **Sylvia L.**, “Mitmenschlichkeit verbindet universell!” [“Humanity links universally!”]. “Die Welt”, 12 Juli 2014, <http://www.welt.de/regionales/duesseldorf/article130050827/Mitmenschlichkeit-verbundet-universell.html>

massacres” of Ottoman Armenians as genocide, albeit for various and varying reasons. The quoted above German case of evasiveness is unfortunately not unique. Just recently has the Australian FO Minister Julie Bishop confirmed in a letter of 4 June 2014 to the Australian Turkish Advocacy Alliance that her government “does not recognize these events as ‘genocide’. While respecting the rights of individuals and groups to have strong views on the matter, the longstanding and clear approach of the Australian government has been not to become involved in this sensitive debate. (...) Australia attaches great importance to its relationship with Turkey, which is underpinned by our shared history at Gallipoli and by recent cooperation in the G20 (...)”¹.

Such opinions must come not only as an enormous disappointment for the descendants of Armenian genocide survivors and the Armenian people in general, but they contain a dangerous message for all those who consider genocide as an appropriate method to solve domestic problems: Can a state murder millions of its citizens and get away with it? Hitler firmly believed into the impunity and oblivion of massive state crimes, according to his statement of 22 August 1939. In a meeting of the military commanders of Germany’s forces few days before Germany’s attack in Poland Hitler called the military leaders, trying to convince them to leave aside all humanitarian concerns when dealing with the Polish nation:

“Our strength lies in our quickness and in our brutality; Genghis Khan has sent millions of women and children into death knowingly and with a light heart. History sees in him only the great founder of States. As to what the weak Western European civilisation asserts about me, that is of no account. I have given the command and I shall shoot everyone who utters one word of criticism, for the goal to be obtained in the war is not that of reaching certain lines but of physically demolishing the opponent. And so for the present only in the East I have put my death-head formations in place with the command relentlessly and without compassion to send to death many women and children of Polish origin and language. Only thus we can gain the living space that we need. Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians”²?

The history of the XX century sadly confirms such cynic conclusion, not only with regard to the Armenian case. It is therefore mandatory to insist on justice, related remembrance and history policies and to unremittingly bring these issues to the awareness of political and legal decision-makers.

¹ Cf. the full text on <http://www.ata-a.org.au/press-release-fa-minister-julie-bishop-events-of-1915-are-not-genocide/>

² Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Third Series, Vol. 7, London, 1954, p. 258; *cf.* the German original in Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945: Aus dem Archiv des Deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes; Serie D (1937-1945, Bd. VII: Die letzten Wochen vor Kriegsausbruch: 9. August bis 3. September 1939. Baden-Baden, MCMLVI, 1956, p. 171, footnote 1.

**Թեսա Հոֆման – Եզրահանգումներ. Հայոց ցեղասպանության դասերն ու
հետևանքները**

Հայոց ցեղասպանության հարյուրամյա տարելիցի շրջանակներում այսօր անհրաժեշտ է արհեստավարժ քննական վերլուծություն, ինչպես նաև համակողմանի անդրադարձ էթիկայի, քաղաքականության, իրավունքի և օրենսդրության, գիտության և կրթության միանգամայն տարբեր դաշտերում ունեցած ձեռքբերումներին, ձախողումներին և թերացումներին: Տասնամյակներ շարունակ գործունեության այդ բնագավառներում տեղի ունեցած զարգացումներին հետևողները էթիկայի և քաղաքականության պարագայում հավանաբար հուսախաբություն և հիասթափություն են ապրում, մինչդեռ, այնուամենայնիվ, գիտության և կրթության ոլորտներում ակնառու առաջընթաց է գրանցվել: Սույն հոդվածի առաջին մասում վերլուծվում է Օսմանյան կայսրությունում հայերի բնաջնջմանը վերաբերող հետազոտությունների արդի վիճակը, ինչպես նաև անդրադարձ է կատարվում դեռևս առկա՝ չլուծված կամ անտեսված թեմաներից մի քանիսին: Երկրորդ մասում մատնանշվում են քաղաքականության, իրավունքի և օրենսդրության բնագավառներում թույլ տրված սխալներն ու վրիպումները որպես այդ ամենի վառ օրինակ դիտարկելով Գերմանիայի պարագան:

Тесса Хофман – Заключение: уроки и следствия Геноцида армян

В рамках столетней годовщины Геноцида армян становится необходимым профессиональный критический анализ, а также суммарное обращение к достижениям, ошибкам и провалам в этике, политике, праве и законодательстве и совершенно различных областях науки и культуры. Те, кто на протяжении десятилетий следовали за развитиям в этих сферах, в случае этики и политики, по всей вероятности, переживают разочарование и отчаяние, между тем, в сферах науки и образования происходил прогресс, заслуживающий внимания. В первой части настоящей статьи анализируется современное положение исследований, касающихся уничтожения армян в Османской Империи, а также затрагиваются несколько еще нерешенных или проигнорированных тем. Во второй части статьи подчеркиваются ошибки и промахи, возникшие в сферах политики, права и законодательства, рассматривая в качестве наиболее яркого примера Германию.